Veritas Ultra Empirismum

כתב על ידי אחמד מורטצא

Hardcore verificationism, as formulated by the early Logical Positivists (Vienna Circle, 1920s–1930s), asserts:

> "A proposition is meaningful if and only if ↔ it can be directly verified by sensory observation". Id est: empiricism.

This principle was intended as both a criterion of meaning and a criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. Its implications are radical: theology, metaphysics, are declared by way of this meaningless; science is reduced to direct observation alone. .

And I shall show to how Hardcore verificationism collapses under both internal and external critique. Internally, it is self-refuting and excludes the very scientific laws it sought to vindicate. Externally, it dismisses as meaningless the domains of theoretical science,, and metaphysics, domains that are inescapably central to human thought and practice.

Too often, I hear "Science is based upon fact!" This is a misconception. Science, as it is actually practiced, is not founded upon immutable certainties but upon methods of inquiry. Through long reflection and the weighing of arguments, I have come to see that what is called modern science particularly in its diluted inheritance of hardcore verificationism rests not upon facts, but upon probabilities. It hurts me to think, and it burdens me, for my mind persistently reopens debate, and converses with me, testing each position against others. Yet from this inner struggle I have arrived at a settled conviction: what is today called "modern science," operating within the diluted legacy of hardcore verificationism, is not grounded in fact in any absolute sense.

They have elevated verificationism to the status of absolute truth on the basis of philosophical reasoning, yet in doing so dismissed philosophy itself, as though they had not arrived at their principle through philosophy in the first place, and the effects of such ideology is seen when a geocentrist rejects heliocentrism, they reply: "But empricism proves it". And I have written a response in defence of geocentrism in which I have refuted this very notion of strict empiricism, however it is not the scope of such discussion as of now.

Now a reductio upon this radical skepticsm ideology:

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π1: Hardcore verificationism states: A proposition is meaningful if and only if ↔ it can be directly verified by sensory observation.

□□□□

π2: The verification principle itself is a philosophical-metalinguistic claim, not something empirically verifiable.

π3: If the principle cannot be verified by sensory observation, then by its own standard it is meaningless.

∴ Hardcore verificationism is self-refuting; it invalidates itself.

What's hilarious is that this very refutation is also used against radical skeptics when it comes to pure philosophy, I guess it's just a coincidence that both arguments used entail the same conclusion upon either of the varying assertions right? It is as if so that hardcore verificationism isn't radical skepticism right? To be clear, that is me merely being sarcastic and in doing so showing for the relation between hardcore verificationism and radical skepticism, in which we conclude, verificationism ≡ radical skepticism.

Pure Sophistry.

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π1: Many scientific laws are universal generalizations (exempli gratia, "All metals expand when heated," "Gravity applies everywhere").

π2: Universal claims cannot be directly verified by finite sensory observations.

π3: Hardcore verificationism requires direct verification for meaningfulness.

∴ Hardcore verificationism renders universal scientific laws meaningless, thereby undermining the very enterprise of science.

π1: Modern science employs entities not directly observable by the senses (e.g., atoms, electrons, quarks, spacetime curvature).

π2: These entities are accepted based on indirect evidence and theoretical coherence, not sensory verification.

π3: Hardcore verificationism denies meaning to entities not directly observable.

∴ Hardcore verificationism dismisses central components of modern scientific practice as meaningless.

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Hempel's Concession→

π1: Carl Hempel, a leading positivist, admitted (1950) that strict verificationism cannot account for the actual practice of science.

π2: If a principle cannot account for the practice it claims to regulate, it fails as a criterion of meaning and demarcation.

∴ Hardcore verificationism collapses under its own methodological inadequacy.

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The Theory-Ladenness of Observation→

π1: Observation is never "neutral" but always interpreted through theoretical frameworks (Hanson, Kuhn, Feyerabend).

π2: What counts as "observation" (e.g., cloud-chamber tracks) presupposes background theories (e.g., atomic theory).

π3: Hardcore verificationism assumes a mythical "given" of pure observation.

∴ Hardcore verificationism relies on an untenable view of observation and thus collapses under 20th-century philosophy of science.

It is also important as an atomic intoroduction that I introduce the reader to the means by which verificationist's express their policing of meaning, the Logical Positivists (Vienna Circle) in the early 20th century claimed: if a statement cannot in principle be empirically verified, it's meaningless (e.g. metaphysics, theology, much of ethics).

Exempli Gratia: The proposition, which is a declarative statement: "There is a table in the next room" is meaningful because you can verify it through empiricism, in contrast to a certain un-sensed x, then that certain x holds no-

-meaning. Now for how they express this regulation is through by way of notation devices

This phrase in all honesty is more obscure, because in philosophy it usually refers to Carnap's "device of notation" (Notationsmittel) in his Logical Syntax of Language (1934).

As for us we shall stick to this definition to entail the very logic of the verificationists: A notation device is a formal or symbolic convention used to express logical distinctions, without implying metaphysical commitments.

Now, how they connect: Verificationism and notation devices are both part of the [in other words] Logical Empiricist program:

Verificationism polices meaning.

Notation devices police expression.

Together, they work as tools for cleaning philosophy of "metaphysical nonsense" by demanding precise language and testable claims.

Now for weak verificationism, id est, A statement is meaningful if there is some possible evidence that could make it probable, even if not conclusive.

For clarity I shall posit two examples:

Meaningful example:

"There is life on planets outside our galaxy."

→ Even if we can't check them all, the possibility of finding evidence (signals, telescopes, biosignatures) keeps it meaningful.

Meaningless example:

"There exists a transcendent being outside space and time."

→ No conceivable empirical evidence could ever count for or against this. Therefore meaningless here.

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Some logical positivists softened further: a statement is meaningful if it can be indirectly verified by relating it to statements about sense-data.

Meaningful example:

"Electrons exist."

→ We can't see electrons directly, but their effects (cloud chamber tracks, currents, detectors) are verifiable. So the statement is indirectly meaningful.

Meaningless example:

"There exists a reality wholly beyond all possible experience."

→ If no indirect chain of observable consequences exists, then it is meaningless.

Then we have Popper's Modification 'The Falsifiability shift' which is a rejection of verificationism, Popper wasn't a verificationist, but he reformulated the issue: a statement is scientific and meaningful if it is in principle falsifiable.

Meaningful example:

"All swans are white."

→ One black swan would falsify it.

Meaningless example:

"There are invisible swans that no observation could ever detect."

→ Unfalsifiable, so non-scientific and meaningless in Popper's sense.

Popper argued that universal scientific statements (e.g. "all swans are white") cannot ever be conclusively verified by sense-experience. What matters is falsifiability: a single counterexample refutes. Now moving on to modern science, Modern accounts of science often treat theories as conjectures subject

to falsification, not as things to be “proven true” by accumulating observations. Studies (like those looking at published “Nature” papers) show that many scientific works do not attempt to verify hypotheses in the strong sense; they’re more exploratory, correlational, etc. One such analysis is by Sven Ove Hansson (2006), which suggests only a small fraction of scientific papers conform to strong falsificationist (hence a non-strong verificationist) standard. Scientific Realism (a major view in philosophy of science) holds that theories describe both observable and unobservable entities. Entities like electrons, photons, fields, black holes etc. are treated as real (even though they’re not directly perceived).

Example: The “From Unobservable to Observable: Scientific Realism and the Discovery of Radium” paper. It shows how radium — once considered mainly unobservable — gained status through indirect consequences and experiments, illustrating that science accepts things via indirect evidence.

Dark matter is a great case: it isn’t “seen” directly (it doesn’t emit/absorb light), but scientists accept its existence based on multiple independent lines of indirect evidence (galaxy rotation curves, gravitational lensing, cosmic microwave background, etc.).

A summary of the above:

> Strong verificationism is rejected logically by philosophers like Popper, and empirically by observing how science is actually done (many experiments do not conform to strict verification criteria).
>
> Modern Science accepts weaker forms of verification or evidence: indirect observations, inference to the best explanation, entities that are never directly seen but have observable effects.
>
> Modern Science leans towards falsificationism (or at least a model of science where falsification + predictive risk is central), plus pragmatic utility as major criteria in theory choice.

All of these shifts are philosophical views, and you can not deny that they are built on philosophical principles, in which I say to the Physicists, Physics is built on philosophical ‘rules’, I also say to the Atheist, you can not assert an argument against god ‘proficiently’ except by way of returning to verificationism, and maybe even poppers reformation, all are philosophical views, and do not hold ‘fact’ or truth inherently.

It is absurd that either of the aforementioned [Physicists and Atheists] reject that their views in science are built on philosophical principles, it really is absurd.

If this has been clarified, I shall now posit a refutation upon heliocentrism.

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I

Prima Quaestio

p1• special relativity applies to inertial frames.

p2• in an inertial description, planets are in motion and the sun itself has motion [exempli gratia: orbits the milky way], this also negates the stationary concept of the earth, in premise 3 I shall respond to a possible response.

p3• the observational standpoint “the earth is stationary for us” is an observer-relative description [id est• it is an assumption about our reference frame, not direct proof of absolute rest, nor sunnah proof nor quranic]

p4• physics produces empirical laws via reason plus mathematics: mathematics formulates theories, but reason and empirical testing justify which formulation we accept; therefore multiple mathematically-consistent descriptions [exempli gratia: heliocentric or geocentric] can in principle be constructed, but they may require introducing fictitious forces to match observations.

p5• classical scholarly [muslim & catholic] positions hold the earth stationary “inward and outward”, this as a theological-interpretive claim is independent of whether modern physics endorses it or endorses it.

> even if physics gives a successful inertial-frame description where the sun moves, that does not logically force rejection of the scholarly claim

> that the earth is stationary [because the scholarly claim is asserted as doctrinal and not empirically dependent].

ergō• the scholarly claim that the Earth is stationary remains valid (within its own theological framework) regardless of whether physics models the system heliocentrically; attempts to make a geocentric physics are possible in principle but will require additional fictitious forces or assumptions.

> now a response to possible objections; we don't deny empirical observation, nor do we "make a theological point immune to reality", and this in reality self refutes to be honest, for the attributes of god are not an empirical observation, we do see the effects of his creation however, but with they are the volitional attributes. As for non-volational, then they are a theological observation, so if one asserts this as a reductio then he is obligated to reject the attributes of god since [∵] they don't preserve empirical observation, and he falls into the traps of hume and his retarded assumptions.

In summary: ¬physics ≠ ¬truth.

Secunda Quaestio

II

a reductio of the mass use of ocham's razor;

Π1• occam's razor asserts that • all else equal, the simplest explanation is preferable.

Π2• "simplicity" is [saepe] interpreted as **brevity of explanation**.

Π3• truth is **independent of the length or complexity** of an explanation; a complex exposition can preserve truth fully.

Π5• limiting explanatory adequacy to simplicity especially as a universal principle is **unjustified**, because the truth of a proposition does not necessarily correlate with its brevity.

> ∴ ocham's razor **cannot be treated as a universal law of reasoning**

to reject compact explanation, i do suppose the law doesn't even assert a rejection of compact explanations, however this distinction should be made since complex explanations may equally or more accurately preserve truth. In summary: x (CE(x) TE(x)).

III

Tertia Quaestio

Arbitrary to what is being discussed I do see it beneficial I assert a reductio upon moral relativism as a primer for what's to come, moral relativism asserts that all value judgments are subjective, including moral and epistemic evaluations (id est • no value is objectively binding), this is basically premise one with the exception that it hasn't been numbered.

π2• valuing logic and reason [id est• holding to coherence & noncontradiction] is itself a value judgment**.**

π3• if all value judgments are subjective (from π1), then valuing logic is also subjective, and its normative force is not binding but arbitrary.

π4• if logic is arbitrary, then the principles of valid inference (including LNC, LEM P∨ ¬P) are not obligatory, meaning any argument can be both true and false without contradiction.

π5• Moral relativism depends on logical reasoning to assert its own claim (id est • it uses arguments, analogies, and critique).

π6• If logic is arbitrary (from π4), then the argument for moral relativism cannot coherently assert itself, because its very method of proof loses normative force.

∴ moral relativism **self-refutes**: it cannot consistently maintain the subjectivity of all values while simultaneously valuing logic, because valuing logic is itself a value judgment [of hierarchy] that must retain at least minimal objectivity to make any argument coherent.

I would prefer to mention that I do not see (Aristotelian) logic a valid science, meaning; it is not universally applicable, and certain laws and so on should be rejected, deductive reasoning does not preserve truth always, nor does non-deductive reasoning always preserve probability and this is a fallacy which need not a response, you could probably assert a valid dichotomy in the sense of probability preserving truth, likewise with deductive reasoning preserving probability, however in summary I take the quran, the sunnah of the messenger muhammad ﷺ and the understanding of the first three generations as evidence, spirituality and in a worldly sense and anyone who desires to disagree can rub his face in dirt and reiterate his disagreement within the mud his face is covered with, the works of ibn taymiyyah suffice as a response.

IIII

Quarta Quaestio

To strengthen the integrity of the first quaestio I shall share certain excerpts of physicists admitting that heliocentrism is a philosophical concept formulated by math; Fred Hoyle (1915- 2001), famous English astronomer, wrote:

> Let it be understood at the outset that it makes no difference, from the point of view of describing planetary motion, whether we take the Earth or the Sun as the center of the solar system. Since the issue is one of relative motion only, there are infinitely many exactly equivalent descriptions referred to different centers - in principle any point will do, the Moon, Jupiter.... So the passions loosed on the world by the publication of Copernicus' book, De revolutionibus orbium caelestium libri VI, were logically irrelevant.

Nicolaus Copernicus: An Essay on his Life and Work, (Harper & Row, 1973), p.1.

Likewise, George Ellis who is a famous theoretical physicist and astronomer who authored books with Stephen Hawking. In a profile in Scientific American W.W. Gibbs quotes Ellis:

> People need to be aware that there is a range of models that could explain the observations... For instance, I can construct you a spherically symmetrical universe with Earth at its center, and you cannot disprove it based on observations... You can only exclude it on philosophical grounds... What I want to bring into the open is the fact that we are using philosophical criteria in choosing our models. A lot of cosmology tries to hide that. Scientific American 273(4):55, October 1995.

The claim I am making clear here, is that physics is based on pure reason, thus does not preserve truth inherently, whether geocentrism or heliocentrism is preferred, it all returns to my first quaestio in stating that either can be - substantiated for, it is arbitrary for me to exhibit to what view I take for, this isn't the reason I postulate for my first quaestio, the reason is to show it is all based on reason and not evident truth.

V

Quinta Quaestio

We do not treat empirical regularities as universal laws that cannot be broken, I could prove my view through a diluted version of Hume's problem of induction, however to save time I shall posit an analogy or two to show that it's universality is very absurd.

An example is Newton's Constant; objects in free fall accelerate at 9.8 m/s² near Earth's surface, this is moreover an approximation; at relativistic speeds or in strong gravitational fields, Newtonian laws fail and general relativity takes over.Therefore, empirical laws have domains of validity; they are not universal in all contexts.

Empiricism is not always valid, and anyone who says otherwise, and i'm sorry to say it; is an absolute donkey.

In summary: $E(x) \rightarrow \neg U(x)$
E for empiricism, U for universality.

A question I sincerely pose to the protestant [from a muslim], you choose to disbelieve in 30 verses clearly indicating geocentrism, yet you claim christianity? the same I ask to the sururi extremist retard, you choose to reject every single exegesis,

and every scholar who takes the view of geocentrism, yet you claim love for the sunnah of the prophet ﷺ? From al-qurtubi, at-tabari, at-tuwayjiri, ibn baz et cetera, but physics which preserves probability outweighs your religion and the views of its scholars?

Now for clarity This diluted version of Physic Empiricism which is literal hardcore verificationism says “only what we observe is true”.
However in physics, some of the most essential
concepts are not directly observable: Spacetime curvature in general relativity is never observed directly, we measure effects (like light bending).Quantum wavefunctions are mathematical constructs, not empirical objects. Dark matter and dark energy are posited not because we see them, but because equations don’t work without them.

Mathematics itself is not empirical, it’s abstract. Yet physics cannot move an inch without it. This shows the human mind’s capacity for necessary truths beyond sensory data, and if you were to say, “only what is empirically verifiable is meaningful,” that very principle is not empirically verifiable itself, It is a philosophical verificationist claim about knowledge. Thus, strict empiricism is self-defeating.

Drawing from my Newtonian analogy, I offer this concise explanation: we begin with a given observation, which is synthesised into Model A. Later, empiricism produces a new observation, giving rise to Model B, which overlaps with Model A. Since physics is concerned with the how of things as revealed through observation, it is thereby compelled to explain why both models have held sway. History demonstrates that this has indeed occurred within physics. Thus I conclude: within its own framework, strict empiricism does not safeguard truth itself, it safeguards only probability, for by its nature it commits to variation.

Another paradigmatic case is the evolving understanding of the nature of light. Newton’s corpuscular theory (Model A) successfully described reflection and rectilinear propagation, positing that light consists of discrete particles. The discovery of interference patterns in Young’s double-slit experiment (1801) revealed phenomena incompatible with a purely particulate description, giving rise to the wave theory of light (Model B) and explaining diffraction and interference. Later, the photoelectric effect (Einstein, 1905) demonstrated that light also behaves as discrete quanta under certain conditions, necessitating a quantum model (Model C) that reconciles wave- and particle-like behaviour. Each successive model did not wholly invalidate its predecessors; rather, it demonstrated the conditions under which prior models accurately approximated natural phenomena.

From this, one has to conclude that strict empiricism, considered as a self-contained epistemological framework, does not safeguard absolute truth. Instead, it safeguards probability, as each empirical observation inherently permits variation and necessitates the continual refinement of models to accommodate new data. Physics, in this respect, illustrates the limitations of empiricism in guaranteeing truth beyond probabilistic approximation.

Quaestio Sexta

VI

Now rejecting the planetary of the earth as I have observed, then this in reality all resolves around the definition of the I.A.U [id est• international astronomical union] of what a planet is, the first factor being that it must orbit a star. Now of course as a geocentrist, you would reject it orbits a/the star [the sun], so this in all honesty is a matter with regard to semantics and you can not be mocked for it, and anyone who mocks this view is a retard who has to mock all of the mufassireen and the salaf for taking the view of geocentrism, he has to likewise mock the quran, I say with all honesty, become an atheist, if you are willing to reject the scholarly view of the earth being stationary which is the view of all muslim scholars, for a simple probable belief in physics, postulated by atheists, save yourself time and become an atheist

> And with this I conclude saying: You can only exclude geocentrism on philosophical verificationist grounds.

Now after my six arguments I shall now respond to objections: I do not reject physics universally, nor do I reject empricism universally, nor are my arguments category errors in the sense of them being different to the science of physics, suffices for that my first quaestio in proving that physics is built on reason & empricism and is only defended by way of philosophy. This does not entail I reject physics in totality, nor does it entail I call to the earth being flat, nor does it entail that one is obliged to affirm either of the models:



Systema Ptolemaicum



Systema Thyconicum

Arbitrary to this paper, I do wish to defend a position of Ibn taymiyyah in his writing of ‘Naqdh-al-mantiq’. I will rely upon the translation of Wael B. Hallaq.

7. Second, it may be argued that what is intended by ‘definition’ is the definiendum itself. But this is not what they mean here. By ‘definition’ they mean the statement indicating the quiddity of the definiendum,[1] for it details what the name indicates in general. We argue that if the definition is the statement of the definer, then the one who defines knows the thing defined either by means of definition or by other means. If the case is the former, then the same can be said of the second definition as was said of the first, and this entails circularity or infinite regress.[2] If it is the latter, then their negative proposition, namely, ‘No concept can be formed except through definition’, is invalid.

Wael does make some annotations, a beautiful annotation in simplifying the argument made here:

above.

[2] The genus and the difference included in the definition presuppose another definition. For example, in the definition of ‘human’ as ‘a rational animal’, the terms ‘rational’ and ‘animal’ must be defined since they are not considered self-evident. The same applies to the terms used in defining the definition of the definition of ‘human’, as well as to the definition of these terms *ad infinitum*, a process ultimately leading to infinite regress. However, if the definiendum was apprehended before apprehending the definition of the terms used in its own definition, then this results in a *petitio principii*, because while ‘humanity’ in the example above was apprehended before ‘animality’, this last is used to apprehend the quiddity of ‘humanity’. See *Naqḍ al-Mantiq*, 184, where Ibn Taymiyya rephrases the argument.

Now I have seen some responses and from them are; the response of the Asharite Abu-Zakariyyah Al-Ansari within his explanation of the logical primer Isaghuji; which correlates in greek to ‘Introduction’. He said: “It has been said: “A definition cannot itself be defined, lest an infinite regress follow.” We reply: “The necessity of regress is denied, because the definition of the definition is itself the definition , just as the existence of existence is itself existence. Meaning: the definition of the definition, insofar as it is a definition, is already

included within the definition, even if it is distinguished by its being added to it."



قيلَ : لا يمكنُ تعريفُ الحدِّ ؛ لئلا يلزمَ التسلسلُ[١] .

وأُجِيبَ : بمنعِ لزومِهِ ؛ لأنَّ حدَّ الحدِّ نفسُ الحدِّ ، كما أنَّ وجودَ الوجودِ هوَ نفسُ الوجودِ ؛ بمعنىٰ : أنَّ حدَّ الحدِّ مِنْ حيثُ إنَّهُ حدٌّ مُندرِجٌ في الحدِّ وإنِ امتازَ عنهُ بإضافتِهِ إليهِ[٢] .

Page 176; Al-Matla'

I reply: The objection made here is the claim that "the definition of definition is itself the definition". This in reality fails as a defense against regress. It commits both a category error and petitio principii. More gravely, when taken seriously, it collapses the distinction between object-level and meta-level inquiry, rendering the very concept of definition unintelligible. Thus, rather than blocking regress, the thesis undermines the possibility of definitional discourse altogether.

Firstly: Category error; The argument conflates two distinct levels: (i) definition as an ontological or conceptual kind, and (ii) definition as a propositional act or statement. To treat these as identical is to confuse a category with another category. One cannot infer properties of the act of defining from the mere existence of a genus without committing this mistake.

Secondly: Petitio principii (begging the question): The argument assumes the very thesis it needs to demonstrate, namely that: Def(Def(x)) = Def(x). (where Def is the definitional operator). But this identity is merely asserted, not proven. To claim "the definition of the definition is itself the definition" is to restate the conclusion rather than justify it. This is reasoning in a circle. The problem posed was whether definition itself can be defined. The reply assumes from the outset that definition is self-defining. Thus, the conclusion ("no regress follows") is already embedded in the premise ("definition needs no definition beyond itself").

The infinite regress is not actually resolved but only avoided by stipulation. If one may simply declare that any second-order definitional inquiry reduces to the first, then one may, by parity, dismiss any regress whatsoever by assertion. This empties the argument of probative force.

“The necessity of regress is denied, because the definition of the definition is itself the definition..	Petitio Principii (begging the question).
“just as the existence of existence is itself existence. Meaning: the definition of the definition, insofar as it is a definition, is already included within the definition, even if it is distinguished by its being added to it.”	Category error, existence is a supreme genus, a defintion has no ontological essence.

I hate philosophers, exempli gratia: it is bizarre that a person see a deductive syllogism whether conditional or categorical and not realise it stands in majority of times upon non-deductive methodologies, by non-deductive i mean; authority, analogy and even causal inference, for this is contrariety [if one was to take this as a universal which is the case with every philosopher] keeping in mind the square of opposition, and that is per Aristotelian logic: the Affirmative Universal in comparison to a Negative Universal, and if one was to ponder he would conclude that in this i am correct, thus they have fell into a false dichotomy in claiming that deductive reasoning inherently preserves truth in contrast to non-deductive reasoning preserving probability, this is not true, the very notion that non-deductive reasoning inherently preserves probability can also be said for deductive reasoning likewise, and then you have the radical skeptics of our time using such obscure logical grounds to justify their skepticism like is with the case of the low priors argument.

And in all honesty, the individuals who endorse theirselves within logic are at a majority of time pseudo intellectual beings who imagine themselves the new coming of Ibn Taymiyyah, for example, the Kalam ontological argument, a radical skepticist would object in majority of times upon the basis → objections to p1 are QM (id est- an objection made through quantam mechanics); and this in-itself presupposes scientific realism, virtual particles are the same stance reiterated, it presupposes scientific realism, and with all honesty it doesnt even violate ex nihilo nihil fit, heisenberg’s uncertainty principle can not be asserted - unless you prove that scientific realism is sequitur in reasoning especially when one is to talk upon metaphysics, p2 relies on whether one takes b theory or a theory,

with regard to b theory infinite regress is impossible, it's an 'non-tensed' module, b theory includes big bang theory which most scientists/physicists take with cogency, p3/Σ parsimony and contemplation on his creation suffices, fine tuning.

Let it be known: I do not use philosophy whatsoever, I rather reject and warn against it, the Quran suffices as the greatest argument against the creation, the miracles of the Quran, and by miracles I do not intend the so called scientific miracles which are uttered by the tongues of the mass, the Quran is not Interpreted through science, it is merely interpreted by the companions of the messenger muhammad ﷺ and the arabic language, and if one was to ponder through the many exegisis' of the Quran, he would conclude that they do not contradict themselves even if there be a slight difference, and for more on this, you can return to the works of Ibn Taymiyyah.

I finish writing this treatise at 18 years of age, and like I have said before, cogito ergo rideo, that is due to the compound ignorance of these people, the philosophers are the most retarded individuals I have ever seen, their ignorance conflating with the stupidity of the Sururiyah, the followers of Muhammad Surur and his extremist sect.

And I advise the reader to stick to the Quran, the Sunnah of the Messenger ﷺ both upon the understanding of the pious predecessors, the companions, their students, and their students. And I advise to read the works of Ibn Taymiyyah And Rabee' ibn Hadi' Al-Madkhali, for these two men have destroyed the stupidity of the sectarians, and this is why they insult their integrity. Their books stand present, whoever wish to read then let him read, whoever not wish to read then let him die upon his stupidity.

Side-note: Here is al-jurjani saying that Asharites are Jabarites, hilarious



٦٦ التعريفات

الجبرية :
هو من الجبر، وهو إسناد فعل العبد إلى الله تعالى، والجبرية: اثنان: متوسطة، تثبت للعبد كسباً في الفعل كالأشعرية وخالصة لا تثبت، كالجهْمية.

الجبن :
هي هيئة حاصلة للقوة الغضَبية، بها يُحْجِم عن مباشرة ما ينبغي وما لا ينبغي.

الجحد :
ما انجزم بلَمْ لنفي الماضي، وهو عبارة عن الإخبار عن ترك الفعل في الماضي، فيكون النفي أعمَّ منه، وقيل الجحد: عبارة عن الفعل المضارع المجزوم بلَم التي وضعت لنفي الماضي في المعنى وضد الماضي.

الجِد :
هو أن يراد باللفظ معناه الحقيقي، أو المجازي، وهو ضدُّ الهزل.

الجَد الصحيح :
هو الذي لا تدخل في نسبته أم، كأب الأب وإن عَلا.

الجَد الفاسد :
بخلافة، كأب أم الأب، وإن علا.

الجِدال :
عبارة عن مراء يتعلق بإظهار المذاهب

الجدل :
أ ـ هو القياس المؤلف من المشهورات والمسلَّمات، والغرضُ منه إلزامُ الخصم وإقحامُ من هو قاصر عن إدراك مقدمات البرهان.

ب ـ دفع المرء خصمه عن إفساد قوله: بحجة، أو شبهة، أو يقصد به تصحيح كلامه، وهو الخصومة في الحقيقة.

الجدة الصحيحة :
هي التي لم يدخل في نسبتها إلى الميت جدٌّ فاسد، كأم الأم، وأم الأب، وإن علَتا.

الجدة الفاسدة :
بضدّها، كأم أب الأم وإن علت.

الجَرح المجرَّد :
هو ما يُفسَّق به الشاهد ولم يوجب حقاً للشرع؛ كما إذا شهد أن الشاهدين شربا الخمر ولم يتقادم العهد، أو للعبد؛ كما إذا شهد أنهما قتلا النفس عمداً، أو الشاهدَ الفاسق، أو أكلَ الربا، أو المدعي استأجره.

الجَرَس :
إجمال الخطاب الإلهي الوارد على القلب بضرب من القهر، ولذلك شبَّه النبي ﷺ الوحي بصَلصَلة الجرس، وبسِلسِلة على صفوان، وقال: إنه أشد الوحي، فإنَّ كشف تفصيل الأحكام من بطائن غموض الإجمال

كتاب التعريفات

قاموس لمصطلحات وتعريفات
علم الفقه واللغة والفلسفة والنظم والتصوف
والنحو والصرف والعروض والبلاغة
مرتبة على حروف الهجاء من الألف إلى الياء

تأليف
السيد الشريف أبي الحسن علي بن محمد بن علي
الحسيني الجرجاني الحنفي
المتوفى سنة ٨١٦ هـ

اعتنى به
مصطفى شيخ مصطفى

Likewise I leave a note for the pseudo-intellectual Sururi's who name theirselves "Taymis", to know they are heretics, they affirm accidents for Allah openly in their retarded polemics, not knowing it is a heresy, and it holds the same standpoint with regard to affirming a Jism for Allah, we neither Affirm it nor deny it, and here is Ibn Taymiyyah exactly reiterating my point here:



بيان تلبيس الجهمية

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قولهم: الأعراض لا تبقى زمانين؛ لأن هذا مما وكدوا به في اعتقادهم مذهب أهل السنة في ثبوت صفات الله تعالى، وهذه طريقة الكلابية والأشعرية ومن وافقهم من الفقهاء من أهل المذاهب الأربعة وغيرهم.

والمسلك الثاني: طريقة من لا ينازعهم في تسمية صفات الله تعالى أعراضًا، كما لا ينازعهم في تسمية من قامت به من الصفات جسمًا، ولا يقول أيضًا بأن الأعراض لا تبقى، بل الأعراض التي في الحس باقية هي باقية كالألوان وغيرها، بخلاف ما ليس باقيًا كالحركة، وهؤلاء يقولون: هب أن الأعراض قامت به، وهب أنه جسم فليس يلزم من ذلك محذور، وهذا قول طوائف من الصفاتية من الكرامية والشيعة ومن وافقهم من الفقهاء وغيرهم.

● **والمسلك الثالث:** أن لا يقولوا: صفاته أعراض، ولا يقولوا: ليست أعراضًا، كما لا يقولون: إنه جسم، ولا أنه ليس بجسم؛ لأن ذلك كله بدعة مذموم عند سلف الأمة وأئمتها، ولأن النزاع في ذلك إن كان في معنى وجب إثبات المعنى الحق دون المعنى الباطل، فيسأل النفاة المثبتة ما أرادوا بذلك؟ فإن أثبتوا حقًّا وباطلًا أقر الحق دون الباطل، وكذلك النفاة إن نفوا حقًّا وباطلًا نفي الباطل دون الحق، ومن أثبت حقًّا أو نفى باطلًا أقر، ومن أثبت باطلًا أو نفى حقًّا منع. وإن كان النزاع في اللفظ، فما يوصف به الباري نفيًا وإثباتًا من الأسماء والصفات فالمتبع فيه الشريعة؛ فلا يوصف الله إلا بما وصف به نفسه أو وصفه به رسوله لا من الإثبات ولا من النفي. والله ﷻ قد أخبر أنه أحد صمد، ونزه نفسه عن الوالد والولد والشريك والكفو والسمي والحاجة والنوم والموت، وغير ذلك مما دل عليه القرآن.

ولم يذكر هو ولا رسوله ولا أهل العلم والإيمان به: أنه ليس بجسم، ولا جوهر، ولا متحيز، ولا في جهة، ولا أن صفاته ليست بعرض ولا قائمة بالغير ولا نحو ذلك، وكذلك في الإثبات: له الأسماء الحسنى التي يدعى بها، وليس في تلك الأسماء أنه جسم ولا جوهر ونحو ذلك، ولا أن صفاته تسمى أعراضًا

بيان تلبيس الجهمية

في تأسيس بدعهم الكلامية

تأليف شيخ الإسلام

أبي العباس تقي الدين أحمد بن عبد الحليم بن تيمية الحراني

المتوفى سنة ٧٢٨ هـ

اعتنى به وخرج أحاديثه

And I recall hearing a debate, in which a Sururi defined contingency with mutability [temporal variation], he struggles to discern between mutability and modal variation yet debates on metaphysics? For defining contingency as: change, then this is a deficient definition and shows how retarded he is, contingency is defined through its modal variation, not it's mutability which is a temporal variation.

And this goes back to my previous statement: "And in all honesty, the individuals who endorse theirselves within logic are at a majority of time pseudo intellectual beings who imagine themselves the new coming of Ibn Taymiyyah".